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Top Cited Articles of The Journal of Finance(02)

2019-2-20 17:15| 发布者: sujiaoshou| 查看: 332| 评论: 0|原作者: 金融经济学|来自: 金融经济学

摘要: Top Cited Articles of The Journal of Finance(02)

Top Cited Articles of The Journal of Finance(02)

金融经济学 1周前

 

1The Cross-Section Of Expected Stock Returns

The Journal of Finance, 1992, 47(2):427-465

 

Eugene F. Fama, University of Chicago

Kenneth R. French, University of Chicago

 

Abstract

Two easily measured variables, size and book-to-market equity, combine to capture the cross-sectional variation in average stock returns associated with market β, size, leverage, book-to-market equity, and earnings-price ratios. Moreover, when the tests allow for variation in β that is unrelated to size, the relation between market β and average return is flat, even when β is the only explanatory variable.

 

原文链接:

https://www.jstor.org/stable/2329112?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents

 

 

2A Survey Of Corporate Governance

The Journal of Finance, 1997, 52

 

Andrei Shleifer, Harvard University

Robert W. Vishny, University of Chicago


Abstract

This article surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world.

 

原文链接:

https://www.jstor.org/stable/2329497

 

 

3Corporate Ownership Around The World

The Journal of Finance, 1999, 54(2):471-517

 

Rafael La Porta, Harvard University

Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Harvard University

Andrei Shleifer, Harvard University

 

Abstract

We use data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms. We find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few of these firms are widely held, in contrast to Berle and Means's image of ownership of the modern corporation. Rather, these firms are typically controlled by families or the State. Equity control by financial institutions is far less common. The controlling shareholders typically have power over firms significantly in excess of their cash flow rights, primarily through the use of pyramids and participation in management.

 

原文链接:

https://www.jstor.org/stable/2697717

 

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