找回密码
 立即注册

AFA2019会议论文(52):Blockchain and Cryptocurrencies

2019-2-20 17:08| 发布者: sujiaoshou| 查看: 477| 评论: 0|原作者: 金融经济学|来自: 金融经济学

摘要: AFA2019会议论文(52):Blockchain and Cryptocurrencies

AFA2019会议论文(52):Blockchain and Cryptocurrencies

金融经济学 1周前

 

1. Blockchain Economics

 

Joseph Abadi, Princeton University

Markus Brunnermeier, Princeton University

 

Abstract

Whether trustworthy record-keeping is better arranged through distributed ledger technology (DLT) or via a centralized intermediary depends on users’ ability to detect and respond to misconduct. Blockchains/DLT also rely on miners’ competition as miners’ free entry rules out any dynamic incentivization via franchise value, the core mechanism the traditional centralized intermediary arrangement relies on. A blockchain is cheaper when intermediary’s franchise value is not fragile, e.g. for a too-big-to-fail institution. While blockchains can keep track of transfer of ownership, proper enforcement of possession rights is still needed, except in the case of (fiat) cryptocurrencies.

 

原文链接:

https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=AFA2019&paper_id=1699

 

 

2. Initial Coin Offering and Platform Building

 

Jiasun Li, George Mason University

William Mann, UCLA Anderson School of Management

 

Abstract

In an initial coin offering (ICO), a company (or an open-source project) raises funds by pre-selling access to a later product or service. We present a model that rationalizes the use of ICOs for launching peer-to-peer platforms: by adding dynamics to a platform launch, ICOs can 1) solve a coordination failure inherent in many platforms with network effects; and 2) harness the “wisdom of the crowd” by aggregating dispersed information about platform quality. Through either mechanism, an ICO increases platform value, makes the launch of a valuable platform more likely, and thus increases social welfare. We use our model to provide guidance to regulators: We analyze under what circumstances ICOs should be banned or allowed, and discuss governance mechanisms that they should include.

 

原文链接:

https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=AFA2019&paper_id=1588

 

 

3. An Equilibrium Valuation of Bitcoin and Decentralized Network Assets

 

Emiliano S. Pagnotta, Imperial College London

Andrea Buraschi, Imperial College London

 

Abstract

We address the valuation of bitcoins and other blockchain tokens in a new type of production economy: a decentralized financial network (DN). An identifying property of these assets is that contributors to the network trust (miners) are compensated in units of the same asset that are used by consumers of network applications, which we call unity. As a result, the overall production (hashrate) that affect network trust and the bitcoin price are jointly determined. We characterize the demand for bitcoins and the supply of resources that secure the network and show that the valuation of bitcoins can be obtained by solving a fixed-point problem and study its determinants. We show that the unity property induces “price-hashrate spirals” that amplify the price impact of demand and supply shocks vis-à-vis traditional assets.

 

原文链接:

https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=AFA2019&paper_id=1978

 

END

 

 

发表评论

相关分类

用户反馈
客户端