AFA2019会议论文（42）：Social Corporate Finance

AFA2019会议论文（42）：Social Corporate Finance

金融经济学 今天

1、Does Analyst Coverage Affect Workplace Safety

Daniel Bradley, University of South Florida

Connie Mao, Temple University

Chi Zhang, University of Massachusetts, Lowell

Abstract

We study the impact of analyst coverage on workplace safety and find work-related injury rates are associated with a 17.5% decline from the mean-level when analyst coverage increases from the 25th to 75th percentile. This relation is supported using plausibly exogenous terminations in analyst coverage and is strongest in industries that are more dangerous, unionized and for firms followed by all-star analysts. Firms with more analyst coverage are more likely to adopt safety clauses in compensation contracts and are rated higher in workplace safety culture. Our results suggest analysts have an important impact on employee welfare.

原文链接：

https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=AFA2019&paper_id=770

2、The Impact of Obamacare on Firm Employment and Performance

Heitor Almeida, University of Illinois

Ruidi Huang, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Ping Liu, University at Buffalo, the State University of New York

Yuhai Xuan, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Abstract

We study the impact of Obamacare on firm employment and performance using hand-collected firm-level employee health insurance data. We show that Obamacare is associated with a significant increase in health insurance premia for employees in company-sponsored health insurance plans. Perhaps because of this increase in cost, companies with a large fraction of employees on their health insurance plans prior to Obamacare actively reduce enrollment in these plans after the law was enacted. We also find evidence that these same companies shift their employment composition from full-time employees to part-time, temporary, or seasonal workers, who are not covered in employer-sponsored health insurance plans. We do not find any evidence of deterioration in performance in companies that were more exposed to the increase in health insurance premia, perhaps because these companies adjust to the new regulation by changing the composition of employment towards part-time employees.

原文链接：

https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=AFA2019&paper_id=868

3、Punish One, Teach A Hundred: The Sobering Effect of Punishment on the Unpunished

Francesco D'Acunto, Boston College

Michael Weber, University of Chicago

Jin Xie, The Chinese University of Hong Kong

Abstract

Direct experience of a peer’s punishment might make salient the probability and negative consequences of facing punishment, and hence induce a change in the behavior of non-punished peers. We test for this mechanism in a unique setting. After observing peer firms punished for wrongdoing, Chinese listed State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) – which are less disciplined by traditional governance mechanisms than non-SOEs – cut the resources they tunnel to related private parties via loan guarantees, move to more independent boards, cut inefficient investment, and increase total factor productivity. SOEs experience positive cumulative abnormal returns around the announcements of peers’ punishment, which suggests a positive association between peers’ punishment and shareholder value. SOEs do not shift to more opaque forms of tunneling – the bank credit and investment of related parties drop and do not revert after peers’ punishment.

原文链接：

https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=AFA2019&paper_id=835

4、Pay Inequality and Public Sector Performance: Evidence from the SEC’s Enforcement Activity 

Joseph Kalmenovitz, New York University

Abstract

I study how pay inequality affects financial market regulation, by using original employee-level data on enforcement staff at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). I identify inequality effects in a diff-in-diff framework, with management departures as a treatment, and apply numerous tests to rule out alter- native explanations. Large pay gaps generate ”tournament” incentives, leading to increased enforcement activity and to improved job performance. The results provide micro-level evidence that the SEC’s internal organization affects financial markets, and highlight a novel link between pay inequality and regulation.

原文链接：

https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=AFA2019&paper_id=2090

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