AFA2019会议论文（33）：Policy and Regulatory Issues

AFA2019会议论文（33）：Policy and Regulatory Issues

金融经济学 今天

1、Government Investment in Publicly Traded Firms

Kateryna Holland, Purdue University

Abstract

I examine shareholder wealth effects associated with different types of government investors across 71 countries between 1987 and 2013. State investments, similar in dollar amount to state privatizations, have increased target shareholder wealth by over USD 50 billion. But market participants differentiate among government entities as target shareholders lose over USD 14 billion, when the investment is announced by the political arms of government rather than the industrial or the financial arms. The apparent intent of government agency is considered by private investors.

原文链接：

https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=AFA2019&paper_id=405

2、The Hidden Costs of Being Public - Evidence from Multinational Firms operating in Emerging Markets

Pablo Slutzky, University of Maryland

Abstract

I study the differential compliance costs that listed multinational firms face when operating in emerging markets, vis-`a-vis similar but private firms. I first exploit a natural experiment to show that the ownership structure of a firm affects its degree of compliance with regulations, with publicly listed firms complying more than privately held ones. Then I show that this differential compliance imposes a burden on listed firms that helps explain the patterns of M&A activity in emerging markets. When the level of market regulations increases, private firms acquire listed ones, and when the level decreases the pattern reverses. This effect is stronger for listed firms that are subject to stricter auditing and enforcement standards, suggesting that scrutiny plays an important role. Taken together, these results uncover an additional cost faced by listed firms, identify a new driver of M&A transactions, and show evidence that high levels of regulation lead to opaque corporate structures.

原文链接：

https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=AFA2019&paper_id=534

3、Regulatory Integration of International Capital Markets 

Jean-Marie Meier, University of Texas at Dallas

Abstract

I examine the financial and real effects of regulatory integration of international capital markets using a unique policy plan by the European Union, which creates a common European market for financial services and capital, through, e.g., passporting rights. For identification, I exploit the bilateral and staggered nature of laws that are passed at the European level but are implemented by national governments. Over its implementation, regulatory integration leads to large increases in external financing, investment and employment for publicly listed firms. These results highlight the importance of regulatory integration of international capital markets for firms’ financing decisions and real outcomes.

原文链接：

https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=AFA2019&paper_id=1522

4、How America Lost Its Competitive Edge: A Study of Institutional Drift 

German Gutierrez, New York University

Thomas Philippon, New York University

Abstract

Until the 1990's, U.S. markets were more competitive than European markets. Today, European markets have lower concentration, lower excess profits, and lower barriers to entry. We document this surprising outcome and propose an explanation using a model of political support. Politicians care about welfare and about the profits of certain industries. We show that when politicians from different countries set up a common regulator, they deliberately make it more independent and more pro-competition than if the same politicians all lived in the same country. This explains why, even though they appear broadly similar, European institutions are often granted a higher degree of independence than American institutions. We find support for the predictions of the model. In Europe, countries with weak institutions benefited more from the delegation of antitrust enforcement to the EU level. Political and lobbying expenditures have increased more in America than in Europe, and using data across industries and across states, we show that these expenditures explain the relative rise of concentration and market power in the US.

原文链接：

https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=AFA2019&paper_id=1783

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