AFA2019会议论文（21）：Information and Disclosure

AFA2019会议论文（21）：Information and Disclosure

金融经济学 3天前

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Redact When Competitors Act

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Optimal Disclosure and Fight for Attention

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Externalities of Accounting Disclosures: Evidence from the Federal Reserve

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Monitor Reputation and Transparency

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1、Redact When Competitors Act

Xiaoli Tian, Georgetown University

Miaomiao Yu, Louisiana State University

Abstract

This study examines the impact of competition induced by product market dynamics on managers’ decision to redact disclosures in material contracts. Furthermore, we also test whether redactions are effective at defending a firm’s product market competitiveness. We conjecture that predation risk for incumbent increases when rivals are actively repositioning themselves in the product market. This elevated predation risk can increase managers’ incentive to hide disclosures with high proprietary costs. Using redacted disclosures from material contracts to capture firms’ incentives to withhold proprietary information, we find that product market instability and product threat from both new and ex rivals are positively associated with the likelihood of redactions. These results highlight the important effects of product market dynamics on managers’ decisions to redact. Furthermore, this study provides some initial evidence that redacting firms enjoy higher market share growth, higher market power and abnormal returns, likely reflecting that redactions can be effective at helping firms hide value generating activities at its inception stage.

原文链接：

https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=AFA2019&paper_id=190

2、Optimal Disclosure and Fight for Attention

Jan Schneemeier, Indiana University 

Abstract

In this paper, firm managers use their disclosure policy to direct speculators’ scarce attention towards their firm. More attention implies greater outside information and strengthens the feedback effect from stock prices to firm investment. The model highlights a novel trade-off associated with disclosure. While more precise public information crowds-out the value of private information, it can also signal high firm quality to the financial market. If the spread between the (unknown) quality of firms is sufficiently high, there is a separating equilibrium with partial disclosure by the high-quality firm and no disclosure by the low-quality firm. Otherwise, there is a pooling equilibrium without disclosure. Surprisingly, the pooling equilibrium is generally more efficient because it directs attention to the firm with a more efficient use for it.

原文链接：

https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=AFA2019&paper_id=518

3、Externalities of Accounting Disclosures: Evidence from the Federal Reserve

Edward Li, Baruch College

 Gary Lind, Rice University

 K. Ramesh, Rice University

Min Shen, Baruch College

Abstract

Using unique data that track the Federal Reserve’s access of SEC filings, we examine whether the information asymmetry between the Fed and the public has a “granular” origin. We show that the Fed’s access of SEC filings increases significantly when the economy performs poorly and the financial system is less stable, and that it focuses more on firms whose idiosyncratic shocks have a greater impact on macroeconomic fluctuations. We also show that qualitative information in Fed-accessed filings is predictive of the Fed’s forecasts for economic growth, beyond information in commercial forecasts.

原文链接：

https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=AFA2019&paper_id=596

4、Monitor Reputation and Transparency

Ivan Marinovic, Stanford University

Martin Szydlowski, University of Minnesota

Abstract

We study the disclosure policy of a regulator who oversees a monitor with reputation concerns. The monitor faces a strategic agent, who chooses how much to manipulate in response to the monitor’s reputation. Manipulation increases the arrival rate of a “bad news” shock, but the agent manipulates less for higher reputations. This leads to a unique “Shirk-Work-Shirk” equilibrium in which the monitor only exerts effort for intermediate reputations. Hence, uncertainty about the monitor’s type is valuable. Instead of providing transparency, the regulator’s disclosure keeps the monitor’s reputation intermediate, which requires releasing information which damages reputation. The regulator reveals delayed bad news for low reputations, delayed good news for intermediate reputations, but nothing for high reputations. Her policy becomes more lenient over time – she never ruins a good reputation.

原文链接：

https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=AFA2019&paper_id=1438

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