找回密码
 立即注册

AFA2019会议论文(20):Information and Competition in Banking

2019-1-12 22:19| 发布者: sujiaoshou| 查看: 312| 评论: 0|原作者: 金融经济学|来自: 金融经济学

摘要: AFA2019会议论文(20):Information and Competition in Banking

AFA2019会议论文(20):Information and Competition in Banking

金融经济学 4天前

Economics of Voluntary Information Sharing

· 

· 

Leverage Regulation and Market Structure: An Empirical Model of the UK Mortgage Market

· 

· 

Bank Transparency and Deposit Flows

· 

· 

How Does Competition Affect Bank Lending? Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Bank Mergers

· 

 

 

1、Economics of Voluntary Information Sharing

 

Jose Liberti,Northwestern University and DePaul University

Jason Sturgess,Queen Mary University of London

Andrew Sutherland,Massachusetts Institute of Technology

 

Abstract

We show that lenders join a U.S. commercial credit bureau when information asymmetries between incumbents and entrants create an adverse selection problem that hinders market entry.Lenders also delay joining when information asymmetries protect them from competition in existing markets, consistent with lenders trading off new market entry against heightened competition. We exploit shocks to information coverage to show that lenders enter new markets after joining the bureau in a pattern consistent with this trade-off. Our results illuminate why intermediaries voluntarily share information and show how financial technology that mitigates information asymmetries can shape the boundaries of lending.

 

原文链接:

https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=AFA2019&paper_id=551

 

 

2、Leverage Regulation and Market Structure: An Empirical Model of the UK Mortgage Market

 

Matteo Benetton,London School of Economics

 

Abstract

I develop a structural model of mortgage demand and lender competition to study how leverage regulation affects the equilibrium in the UK mortgage market. Using variation in risk-weighted capital requirements across lenders and across mortgages with differential loan-to-values, I show that a one-percentage-point increase in riskweighted capital requirements increases the interest rate by 10 percent for the average mortgage product. The estimated model implies that heterogeneous leverage regulation increases the concentration of mortgage originations, as large lenders exploit a regulatory cost advantage.Counterfactual analyses uncover potential unintended consequences of policies regulating household leverage, since banning the highest loanto-value mortgages may reduce large lenders’ equity buffers, thereby affecting risk.

 

原文链接:

https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=AFA2019&paper_id=2018

 

 

3、Bank Transparency and Deposit Flows 

 

Qi Chen,Duke University

Itay Goldstein,University of Pennsylvania

Zeqiong Huang,Yale University

Rahul Vashishtha,Duke University

 

Abstract

Based on a large sample of U.S. banks from 1994-2013,we find a significantly positive relation between bank transparency and the sensitivity of uninsured deposit flows to bank performance. In addition, more transparent banks rely much more strongly on their equity to finance illiquid assets. These findings demonstrate both the costs and benefits of bank transparency. It makes deposits, which are banks'main funding sources, more sensitive to bank performance and therefore can act as a discipline on banks'risk taking behavior, but it also reduces banks'unique role in liquidity transformation and the creation of safe money-like claims.

 

原文链接:

https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=AFA2019&paper_id=1149

 

 

4、How Does Competition Affect Bank Lending? Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Bank Mergers

 

Carl Liebersohn,Massachusetts Institute of Technology

 

Abstract

This paper studies the effects of bank competition on commercial lending. I find that greater competition causes a change in the quantity and composition of businesses receiving loans, with more loans going to larger and safer borrowers. To identify exogenous changes in bank competition, I exploit discontinuities in the application of bank antitrust rules governing mergers.In markets that fall narrowly below regulatory cutoffs, competition declines due to bank mergers.In markets above cutoffs, forced branch divestitures keep competition constant even though mergers occur. Using a difference-in-differences methodology comparing these types of markets,I estimate that antitrust rules cause the Herfindahl Index to fall in relative terms by 180 points and,consistent with greater competition, deposit rates to rise by 0.13 percentage points. Using loan-level data from commercial mortgages, I show that this change in competition is associated with a 5 percent increase in the likelihood that borrowers take a loan from a local bank and an increase in the average borrower size of 10 percent without a change in the average loan-to-value ratio. For banks not directly involved in a merger, lending to large borrowers increases and the nonperforming loan ratio falls by 0.38 percentage points. Overall, my findings support a model in which competition improves the efficiency and quality of bank lending.

 

原文链接:

https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=AFA2019&paper_id=1972

END

 

发表评论

相关分类

用户反馈
客户端