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AFA2019会议论文(14):Non-Bank Lending Behavior

2019-1-6 14:28| 发布者: sujiaoshou| 查看: 352| 评论: 0|原作者: 金融经济学|来自: 金融经济学

摘要: AFA2019会议论文(14):Non-Bank Lending Behavior

AFA2019会议论文(14):Non-Bank Lending Behavior

金融经济学 5天前

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Lender Forbearance

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Nonbank Lending

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Loan Syndication Structures and Price Collusion

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Trust in Lending

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1Lender Forbearance

 

Andrew Bird, Carnegie Mellon University

Aytekin Ertan, London Business School

Stephen Karolyi, Carnegie Mellon University

Thomas Ruchti, Carnegie Mellon University

 

Abstract

We use a regression discontinuity design to study ex-post discretion in lenders’ contractual enforcement of restrictive covenant violations. At pre-set thresholds, we find that lenders enforce contractual breaches at an 11% rate. Enforcement varies between 5% and 18% over time and peaks when credit conditions are tightest, suggesting that enforcement exacerbates credit cycles. Costly coordination reduces enforcement; increasing the number of lenders required to vote for enforcement action by one reduces enforcement by 6.3%. Consistent with theories of lender competition and implicit contracting, enforcement is less frequent for borrowers with easy access to external financing and for well-reputed lead arrangers.

 

原文链接:

https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=AFA2019&paper_id=2009

 

 

2Nonbank Lending

 

Sergey Chernenko, Purdue University

Isil Erel, Ohio State University

Robert Prilmeier, Tulane University

 

Abstract

We provide novel systematic evidence on the terms of direct lending by nonbank financial institutions. Analyzing hand-collected data for a random sample of publicly-traded middle-market firms during the 2010-2015 period, we find that lending from nonbank financial institutions is substantial, with 30% of all loans being extended by nonbanks. Firms are more likely to borrow from a nonbank lender if local banks are poorly capitalized and less concentrated. Nonbank borrowers are smaller, riskier, and significantly more likely to have negative EBITDA. Nonbank lenders are less likely to include financial covenants in their loans, but appear to engage in substantial ex-ante screening: origination of nonbank loans is associated with larger positive announcement returns while ex-post performance is not distinguishable from bank loans. We also find that nonbank borrowers pay about 200 basis points higher interest rates than bank borrowers do. Using fuzzy regression discontinuity design and matching techniques generates similar results. Overall, our results provide evidence of market segmentation in the commercial loan market, where bank and nonbank lenders utilize different lending technologies and cater to different types of borrowers.

 

原文链接:

https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=AFA2019&paper_id=1849

 

 

3Loan Syndication Structures and Price Collusion

 

Jian Cai, Washington University in St. Louis

Frederik Eidam, Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)

Anthony Saunders, New York University

Sascha Steffen, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management

 

Abstract

How does the organizational form of loan syndicates evolve and what are the effects on price collusion? We develop a novel measure of distance in lending expertise among syndicate lenders, and relate this novel measure to the organizational form of loan syndicates and loan pricing. Studying the U.S. syndicated loan market from 1989 to 2017, we find that the organizational form of loan syndicates significantly varies across our lender measure based on similar specializations in lending which we call syndicated distance. Large lead arrangers prefer to form close and concentrated syndicates by letting lenders with similar lending expertise into their syndicates and allocating those lenders higher loan shares. Analyzing loan pricing, we find that concentrated syndicates possess improved screening abilities, but collude on loan pricing. Consistent with Hatfield et al. (2017), we find however that price collusion of concentrated syndicates only occurs during periods of low market concentration. Our findings imply that both the organizational form of loan syndicates and the level of market concentration affect price collusion.

 

原文链接:

https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=AFA2019&paper_id=544

 

 

4Trust in Lending

 

Robert Merton, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Richard Thakor, University of Minnesota

 

Abstract

This paper develops a theory of trust in lending, and uses it to analyze the competitive interactions between banks and non-bank lenders such as fintech firms. Trust enables lenders to have assured access to financing regardless of market conditions, whereas a loss of investor trust makes this access conditional on market conditions and lender reputation as reflected in the perceived incentives of self-interested lenders to make prudent loans. Banks have stronger incentives to maintain trust—they are “trusted lenders”. When borrower defaults erode trust in lenders, banks are able to survive the erosion of trust when fintech lenders do not. Trust is important for all lenders, but is essential for fintech lenders to operate. Trust is also asymmetric in nature—it is more difficult to gain it than to lose it. We also discuss when informational transparency can substitute for trust and when it cannot.

 

原文链接:

https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=AFA2019&paper_id=826


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